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Abstract
We find a strong tendency for positive returns during the overnight period followed by
reversals during the trading day. This behavior is driven by an opening price that is high
relative to intraday prices. It is concentrated among stocks that have recently attracted the
attention of retail investors, it is more pronounced for stocks that are difficult to value and
costly to arbitrage, and it is greater during periods of high overall retail investor sentiment.
The additional implicit transaction costs for retail traders who buy high-attention stocks
near the open frequently exceed the effective half spread.
I. Introduction
Behavioral finance theories assume that individual investors are subject to
sentiment that makes them willing to trade at prices not justified by fundamen-
tals. Moreover, sentiment-driven retail traders tend to act as a group, trading the
same stocks at the same time and in the same direction. Because trading against
these investors can be costly and risky, the collective price impact of their trading
can be substantial, and sentiment-based trading can cause prices to deviate from
fundamental value for long periods of time.1
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1For theoretical work in this area, see De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). Kumar and Lee (2006) provide empirical evidence that herding by retail
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Barber and Odean (2008) contribute to this literature by theorizing that retail
investors herd into attention-grabbing stocks. They observe that retail investors
who want to buy face a different search problem than those who want to sell.
When retail investors want to buy, they must select from thousands of stocks.
Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2008) hypothesize that individual investors
manage this problem by limiting their search to stocks that have recently attracted
their attention. However, when retail investors want to sell, their decision of which
stock to sell is normally limited to the small set of stocks they own, since retail
investors typically do not sell short. Consistent with this theory, Barber and Odean
show that individual investors are net buyers on the next trading day following
days with high absolute returns, which is one of their proxies for attention.
We extend the theory of Barber and Odean (2008) to develop several pre-
dictions with regard to intraday patterns in retail order flow and price formation.
Our 1st prediction is that an attention-triggering event on day t will lead to retail
buying near the open on day t + 1, because the open is the 1st opportunity since
the previous close for retail investors to buy these high-attention stocks.2 Second,
we hypothesize that this attention-driven retail buying pressure results in opening
prices that are high relative to prices during the rest of the trading day, especially
for stocks that are difficult to value and costly to arbitrage. Finally, we expect that
the impact of attention on opening prices is greater during periods of high overall
retail investor sentiment.
We test these predictions for the 3,000 largest U.S. stocks over the period
from 1996 to 2008. In preliminary analysis, we examine quote midpoints at the
open and close, and we find significant positive mean overnight returns of +10
basis points (bp) per day, along with negative trading day reversals of −7 bp
per day. We then explore whether these overall tendencies are due to a high
opening price, a low closing price, or both. Consistent with our theory of attention-
based overpricing at the open, we find that the opening price is high relative to
subsequent intraday prices, while there is no tendency for the closing price to
decline further below intraday prices.3
These descriptive results are consistent with evidence in two papers that
were developed simultaneously with ours. Branch and Ma (2008) find a negative
correlation between the overnight return and the subsequent trading day return.
They suggest that this tendency may relate to the microstructure of how special-
ists and market makers behave at the open. Cliff, Cooper, and Gulen (2008) find
evidence that the U.S. equity premium over the last decade is solely due to posi-
tive overnight returns. They observe that evidence of systematic negative daytime
reversals “present(s) a serious challenge to traditional asset pricing models from
traders helps to explain returns for stocks with high retail concentration that are also difficult to arbi-
trage. Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) show that stocks bought by retail investors underperform stocks
sold by retail investors over the following year. Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that, after periods of
high (low) sentiment, stocks that are difficult to value and costly to arbitrage earn low (high) returns.
2There is an after-hours market and a pre-open on electronic communication networks (ECNs),
but high costs and other impediments to trading deter retail investors, so that professional traders
dominate these markets (see Barclay and Hendershott (2003), (2004)).
3Reliance on midquotes ensures that our results are not due to bid-ask bounce. Trade prices yield
similar results.
Berkman, Koch, Tuttle, and Zhang 717
the standpoint that these models do not predict negative average returns.” Both of
these studies join our work to emphasize that this behavior represents a surprising
new anomaly, and they call for further efforts to find an explanation. We extend
the analysis and show that our theory of attention-triggered retail buying at the
start of the trading day offers a unifying explanation for this behavior.
Empirical analysis of our theory requires a proxy for the level of retail
investor attention at the start of the typical trading day. We use two size-adjusted
market-based variables from the previous day. First, following Barber and Odean
(2008), we consider the squared return yesterday as a proxy for news that could
attract the attention of retail investors today.4 Second, motivated by the main result
in Barber and Odean that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing
stocks, we use actual net buying by individual investors all day yesterday as a
percent of total volume to proxy for retail attention at the start of trading today.
We obtain this 2nd proxy using proprietary data on the intraday trading
activity of retail investors, for an abridged sample of NASDAQ stocks during
1997–2001.5 These data also enable measurement of the intensity of net buying
by retail investors near the open, relative to that during the rest of the trading
day. Consistent with our 1st hypothesis, we find that i) the intensity of retail buy-
ing near the open is significantly greater for high-attention stocks than for low-
attention stocks, and ii) the intensity of retail buying of high-attention stocks is
significantly greater during the 1st hour than it is during the rest of the trading
day.
We next examine the implications of these intraday patterns in net retail buy-
ing for price formation at the open. When we analyze our main sample of the
3,000 largest U.S. stocks during 1996–2008, we find that the subsample of high-
attention stocks has a significant mean overnight return (trading day reversal) of
+13 (−13) bp per day. In contrast, the analogous results for the subsample of
low-attention stocks are much smaller, at only +3 (−3) bp per day. When we
examine the abridged sample of NASDAQ stocks during 1997–2001, the mean
overnight return (trading day reversal) for high-attention stocks is larger in magni-
tude, at +26 (−27) bp per day. Once again, the analogous results for low-attention
NASDAQ stocks during this period are much smaller, at +4 (−12) bp per day.
Importantly, the average 24-hour (close-to-close) return is never significantly dif-
ferent from 0 for any subsample examined. Together, these results support our
2nd hypothesis, indicating a significant price impact of attention-triggered retail
buying pressure at the open, which is only a short-term intraday phenomenon.
Based on behavioral finance theories, we expect that stock prices may deviate
further from fundamentals if the stock is more difficult to value and more costly
to arbitrage.6 We test this hypothesis by extending our analysis in two ways. First,
we consider the role of institutional ownership in concert with our proxies for
4In addition to absolute returns yesterday, Barber and Odean (2008) consider contemporaneous
daily volume as an alternative measure of retail attention. We have also used share turnover yesterday
to proxy for retail investor attention at today’s open, and we find robust results.
5We are grateful to Jeff Harris, Frank Hatheway, and NASDAQ OMX for providing these propri-
etary data. See Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) for details about the data.
6For example, see Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Kumar and Lee (2006).
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retail attention. Stocks with low institutional holdings have a high concentration
of retail investors and are difficult to short sell.7 Thus, for these stocks, we expect
greater upward price pressure at the open on days following news that attracts the
attention of retail investors. Our results support this prediction. Now the subset
of our main sample of stocks subject to both high attention and low institutional
ownership has a larger mean overnight return (trading day reversal), at +17 (−17)
bp per day. Similarly, the analogous stratification from our abridged sample of
NASDAQ stocks also has a larger mean overnight return (trading day reversal), at
+34 (−42) bp per day. In contrast, the subsample that is least prone to overpricing
at the open, with low attention and high institutional ownership, has overnight
returns and trading day reversals that lack economic or statistical significance.
Second, we show that these overnight return patterns increase in magnitude
for finer subsamples of stocks that are more difficult to value and more costly
to arbitrage. We analyze a subset of the main sample that includes only firms
with high recent volatility, high transaction costs, and high short interest. For this
subset, the mean overnight return (trading day reversal) for the finer subsample of
stocks subject to both high attention and low institutional ownership is +43 (−45)
bp per day. Likewise, the analogous results for the abridged sample of NASDAQ
stocks are +61 (−70) bp per day.
The high opening prices we find for stocks subject to high attention and
low institutional ownership represent a substantial hidden cost of buying at the
open. Our tests are predictive and thus indicate that postponing purchases of these
stocks from the open until later in the day can avoid these hidden costs. Similarly,
selling these stocks at the open, rather than later in the day, can lead to major
improvements in performance. For example, a mean trading day reversal of 45 bp
per day accumulates to 112.5% per annum.
Finally, we investigate whether the magnitude of positive overnight returns
and negative trading day reversals is exacerbated during periods with high overall
investor sentiment (see Baker and Wurgler (2006), (2007)). We consider 2 time-
series proxies that measure variation over time in the level of retail investor senti-
ment. Our 1st measure is the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), while
our 2nd measure is based on market-wide net buying activity by retail investors
during the 1st hour of the trading day. We find that variation over time in the
magnitude of opening price inflation, for stocks subject to high attention and low
institutional holdings, is significantly related to both of these time-series indices
of market sentiment. For example, mean overnight returns and trading day rever-
sals are more than twice as large during months with high versus low sentiment.
In addition, during periods of high investor sentiment, this opening price inflation
can be twice the magnitude of the effective half spread. This evidence establishes
that the behavior of overnight returns and trading day reversals documented in
this study is both economically and statistically significant.
7Kumar and Lee (2006) show that retail trading is negatively correlated with institutional own-
ership. In addition, a large body of work uses low institutional ownership to proxy for binding short
sale constraints (e.g., see Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004), Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter
(2005), Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice (2009), D’Avolio (2002), Nagel (2005), and Ofek,
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004)).
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Our results are robust when we apply this portfolio approach using market-
adjusted returns, median returns, or trade prices to measure returns, and when we
exclude low-price stocks. This behavior is also ubiquitous across small and large
stocks, NASDAQ and NYSE stocks, growth and value stocks, and momentum
winners and losers, although there is a larger mean overnight return and trading
day reversal for small stocks, NASDAQ stocks, growth stocks, and momentum
losers. We also find that these patterns are largest on Mondays, but they also
appear on the other days of the week. In addition, these results appear in all
subperiods. Finally, we find similar results and conclusions when we apply an
alternative Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression approach.
This article proceeds as follows: Section II describes our sample selection
and variable construction. Section III reports descriptive statistics. Section IV
presents the main empirical analysis. Section V analyzes the time-series relation
between overall market sentiment and the magnitude of opening price inflation.
Section VI provides robustness tests, and Section VII summarizes and concludes.
II. Sample Selection and Variable Construction
A. Sample Selection and Daily Return Measures
Our main sample includes the 3,000 largest U.S. firms, according to their
market capitalization on July 1 of each year over the period from 1996 to 2008.
We also apply our analysis to an abridged sample for which proprietary data on
intraday retail trading were obtained from NASDAQ OMX. These proprietary
data describe each trade for NASDAQ stocks during the period from 1997 to 2001,
and they include the identity of market participants on each side of the trade. For
this abridged sample, we follow the procedures in Griffin et al. (2003) and classify
both sides of all trades as originating from an individual or an institution based on
the market participants involved in the trade.
We calculate daily returns using quotations from TAQ.8 The opening price on
day t (OPENt) is the midpoint of the 1st valid bid and ask quotes after 9:30AM.9
The closing price on day t (CLOSEt) is the midpoint of the last valid bid and
ask quotes before 4:00PM.10 We adjust these daily opening and closing prices for
8TAQ’s consolidated quotation file is an aggregation of quotes within each market venue. It
represents a set of “top of book” records for each venue. In order to identify market-wide best
prices, we calculate an inside market across all venues. For the NYSE, this calculation almost never
improves upon the NYSE specialist’s price. However, in NASDAQ issues, ECNs often improve on the
NASDAQ’s reported best price.
9By “the first valid quotes” we mean the 1st quotes after 9:30AM for which there is nonzero trade
size on both the bid and the ask. For NYSE issues, selection of the open is straightforward, since the
opening cross is easily identified and begins the trading day. For NASDAQ issues, selection of the
open is not so straightforward. Although technically the NASDAQ opens at 9:30AM, it is often several
minutes before valid market-maker quotes appear. If the midquote precisely at 9:30AM is used as the
open, these quotes will often be flagged as “closed” by the market participant, or they may have 0
size associated with the prices. In either case, the price does not represent a firm commitment to trade.
This behavior of the NASDAQ open motivates our choice of the 1st valid quotes after 9:30AM as the
opening quotes. Our results are robust when we take the midquote precisely at 9:30AM as the open.
10Occasionally, the final quotes before 4:00PM have zero shares available to trade on one or both
sides, or the quote is flagged as closed. For this reason, we select the last valid quote before 4:00PM.
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stock splits and dividends, before computing daily returns.11 Returns are mea-
sured as the log of the price relative over each time frame considered:
24-Hour, Open-to-Open Return = OTOt = log(OPENt/OPENt−1);
24-Hour, Close-to-Close Return = CTCt = log(CLOSEt/CLOSEt−1);
Overnight, Close-to-Open Return = CTOt = log(OPENt/CLOSEt−1);
Trading Day, Open-to-Close Return = OTCt = log(CLOSEt/OPENt).
Note that CTCt = CTOt + OTCt. Finally, consistent with prior work, we screen
the data for errors and extreme observations.12
B. Variable Construction
For each stock, we estimate 2 proxies for the level of attention by retail
investors at the start of the trading day. Our 1st proxy is the square of yester-
day’s close-to-close return (VOLt−1). This measure is motivated by Barber and
Odean (2008), who use the absolute return yesterday to proxy for news that could
attract the attention of retail investors, and who find that increases in this mea-
sure are associated with increases in net retail buying throughout today. Our 2nd
proxy is net shares bought by individual investors yesterday, as a percent of total
daily share volume (RETAIL NETBUYt−1). This measure is also motivated by
the results in Barber and Odean. Their finding that individual investors are net
buyers of attention-grabbing stocks suggests that stocks with high net retail buy-
ing have (almost by definition) attracted the attention of retail investors.
We also use the abridged sample of NASDAQ stocks over the period from
1997 to 2001 to compute 3 measures of the intensity of net buying by retail
investors near the day’s open:
NetBuy Opent = the mean proportion of stocks on day t for which
the 1st trade of the day is a purchase by a retail
investor, minus 0.5;
NetBuy 15Minit = (Net Retail Buy Volume in 1st 15 min)/
(Total Retail Volume in 1st 15 min);
NetBuy DIFFit = [(Net Retail Volume in 1st hour)− (Net Retail
Volume in last 5.5 hours / 5.5)]/(shares outstanding);
11On days when a cash dividend or a stock split becomes effective at the open, we adjust the TAQ
data on opening and closing prices using Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data on the
amount of the cash dividend or the multiple of the stock split. The adjusted opening and closing prices
are then used to compute each daily return measure.
12Quotes are dropped from our analysis if their “mode” designation indicates that they are not
normal quotes, or if the reported ask price is greater than 1.5 times the reported bid price. In addition,
we omit the daily return if i) the bid-ask spread at the open or close is negative, ii) the opening or
closing spread is greater than $5.00 or 30% of the midpoint quote, iii) the effective half spread is
greater than $2.50 or 15% of the midpoint quote, or iv) the daily open is more than 25% greater (or
less) than both the previous close and the subsequent close. We also drop all daily returns for a firm if
daily quotes are missing for more than 25% of all trading days for that firm.
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where Net Retail Buy Volumeit = the net number of shares of stock i
bought by retail investors over
each time frame, on day t;
and Total Retail Volumeit = the total number of shares of stock i
traded by retail investors over
each time frame, on day t.
The 1st variable defined previously measures the “net” tendency for the 1st trade
of the day to be a purchase by a retail investor. The next variable reflects the flow
of net purchase volume by retail investors as a percent of total retail share vol-
ume over the first 15 minutes of the trading day. The last variable captures the
difference between the rate of net retail buying during the 1st hour and the hourly
rate of net retail buying during the rest of the trading day, as a percent of shares
outstanding.13
Next, following Asquith et al. (2005), we consider 2 proxies for short sale
constraints: institutional ownership and relative short interest. Data on institu-
tional holdings are from CDA Spectrum 13F filings. Each quarter, we compute
the percentage institutional ownership (INSTt) for every firm as aggregate shares
held by institutions scaled by shares outstanding. If a stock is available in CRSP
but has no information on institutional holdings, we assume that the stock has zero
institutional ownership (see Asquith et al. (2005), Gompers and Metrick (2001),
and Nagel (2005)). Our 2nd proxy for short sale constraints is relative short in-
terest (RSIt), measured by the total number of shares sold short as a percent of
shares outstanding, using monthly data on short interest from the NYSE and the
NASDAQ.
Finally, we use 3 measures of transaction costs: the percentage spread at the
open (SPR(OPEN)t) and at the close (SPR(CLOSE)t) and the percentage effective
half spread (SPREADt).14
III. Descriptive Statistics and Intraday Price Patterns
A. Descriptive Statistics for Overnight Returns and Trading Day Returns
In Panel A of Table 1, we report the mean and median values for overnight
returns, trading day returns, and 24-hour returns across all firms and days in the
sample. Note that the average number of firms each day varies from 2,447 to 2,604
across the different measures of daily returns considered. This number is less than
the 3,000 largest U.S. stocks used as the initial sample, because daily opening or
13We have also analyzed net retail buy volume over the 1st minute and the first 5 minutes of the
trading day. Analysis of these variables yields similar results to the measures defined here.
14For every trade, the percentage effective half spread is defined as the absolute difference between
the trade price and the quote midpoint, as a percent of the quote midpoint. Trades are matched to
quotes with a lag of 1 second and then averaged to get the day’s percentage effective half spread. Our
choice of a 1-second lag is taken from the NASDAQ Economic Research Office, which argues that
this lag is optimal to match trades and quotes in its automated electronic system. Our results are not
affected by this choice (see Lee and Ready (1991), Bessembinder (2003)).
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closing quotes are sometimes invalid or unavailable for some of the smaller stocks
(see footnote 12 for details of our screening procedure).
Standard t-tests applied to these mean returns could be biased due to cross-
correlation of daily returns across firms on the same date (Bernard (1987)). In
our analysis we adjust our standard errors for this possibility. Specifically, for
each of the 3,268 trading days in our 13-year sample period, we first compute
the cross-sectional mean (or median) overnight and trading day returns across all
stocks in the sample. We then compute the time-series average of these cross-
sectional mean (or median) returns across all trading days in the sample period.
The corresponding t-statistics are based on the standard errors of the time-series
mean returns.
Results on the left side of Panel A in Table 1 indicate a significant positive
mean overnight return (CTO) of approximately +10 bp per day, and a significant
negative trading day reversal (OTC) of −7 bp per day, when averaged across all
firms and days. As a result, the mean return on a strategy that is long the sample
stocks during the overnight period and short the same stocks during the subse-
quent trading day (DIFF) would be +17 bp per day, before deducting transaction
costs. On the other hand, when we subtract the average bid-ask spread at the daily
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations across Variables
We apply our analysis to 2 major samples. Our main analysis is applied to the subsample of the 3,000 largest U.S. stocks
each year with nonmissing TAQ data on quotes, over the 13-year period 1996–2008. We also analyze an abridged sam-
ple of all NASDAQ firms for which data on intraday retail trading activity are available, over the period 1997–2001. The
focus of this study is on percentage overnight and trading day returns, measured as 100 × the log of the price relative
using quote midpoints at the open and the close: CTO = close-to-open (overnight) return and OTC = open-to-close
(trading day) return. We also analyze the difference between overnight and trading day returns (DIFF = CTO − OTC),
as well as this same difference after deducting transaction costs measured as the average spread at the day’s open and
close: DIFF − TC = DIFF − [SPR(OPEN) + SPR(CLOSE)] / 2. In addition, we examine daily returns measured over the
24-hour periods from close-to-close and from open-to-open: CTC and OTO. We consider 2 alternative proxies for retail
investor attention: i) VOLt−1 = the squared 24-hour (close-to-close) return yesterday, and ii) RETAIL NETBUYt−1 =
the net number of shares bought by retail investors yesterday, as a percent of total share volume. Next, we compute
3 measures of the intensity of net retail buying near the open: NetBuy Open = the mean proportion of stocks each day
for which the 1st trade of the day is a purchase by a Retail Trader, minus 0.5; NetBuy 15Min = (Net Retail Buy Volume)
/ (Total Retail Share Volume), over the first 15 minutes of the trading day; NetBuy Diff = [(Net Retail Buy Volume in 1st
Hour)− (Net Retail Buy Volume in Last 5.5 Hours / 5.5)] / (shares outstanding). The last measure defined above represents
the difference between the hourly rate of net buying by retail investors during the 1st hour of trading and the analogous
hourly rate during the rest of the trading day, as a percent of shares outstanding. We also consider 2 proxies for short sale
constraints and 3 measures of transaction costs. Our 2 proxies for short sale constraints are i) the percent of institutional
ownership (INST), and ii) relative short interest (RSI), measured as the number of shares sold short each month divided by
shares outstanding. Our 3 measures of daily transaction costs include i) the bid-ask spread as a percent of the quote mid-
point at the open (SPR(OPEN)), ii) the analogous percent spread at the close (SPR(CLOSE)), and iii) the daily effective half
spread (SPREAD). Finally, firm size (SIZE) is proxied by daily market capitalization. The descriptive statistics in Panels A
and B are calculated by first computing the cross-sectional mean (or median) each day, and then averaging these means
(or medians) across all days in the sample period. The standard deviation of the time-series average across daily means
is then used to construct the t-test for each statistic in Panels A and B. Similarly, the Spearman correlations in Panel C
are calculated by first computing the cross-sectional correlation each day, and then averaging these correlations across
all days in the sample. Once again, the standard deviation of the time-series average correlation is used to construct the
t-test for each average correlation in Panel C. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for Overnight (Close-to-Open) Returns, Trading Day (Open-to-Close) Returns, and
24-Hour Returns
Overnight and Trading Day Returns 24-Hour Returns
CTO OTC DIFF DIFF – TC CTC OTO
Mean (%) 0.098 −0.066 0.165 −0.708 0.031 0.028
Median (%) 0.045 −0.061 0.108 −0.618 −0.016 −0.027
T (H0: Mean = 0) 5.2** −3.3** 6.1** −24.8** 1.1 1.2
Avg. no. of firms per day 2,447 2,460 2,447 2,383 2,447 2,604
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations across Variables
Proxies for Attention Net Retail Buying Near the Open Short Sale Constraints Transaction Costs Firm Size
1st 1st (1st Hour –
Trade 15-Min Rest)
RETAIL NetBuy NetBuy NetBuy SPR SPR
VOLt−1 NETBUYt−1 Open 15Min DIFF INST RSI (OPEN) (CLOSE) SPREAD SIZE ($000)
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics for Attention, Net Retail Buying Near the Day’s Open, Short Sale Constraints, Transaction Costs, and Firm Size
Mean (%) 0.127 0.000 0.004 0.024 0.025 0.520 0.038 1.057 0.619 0.173 5,210,818
Median (%) 0.059 0.136 0.052 0.038 0.004 0.532 0.022 0.724 0.407 0.123 1,109,367
T (H0: Mean = 0) 31.3** −0.3 3.4** 15.4** 26.2** 214.6** 101.1** 83.6** 68.3** 81.1** 175.8**
Avg. no. of firms per day 2,602 401 161 310 400 2,681 2,681 2,616 2,619 2,463 2,534
Panel C. Spearman Correlations
VOLt−1 1.000
RETAIL NETBUYt−1 0.062** 1.000
NetBuy Open 0.002 0.038** 1.000
NetBuy 15Min 0.004** 0.085** 0.465** 1.000
NetBuy DIFF 0.027** 0.051** 0.135** 0.369** 1.000
INST 0.082** 0.004** 0.006** 0.010** 0.025** 1.000
RSI 0.358** 0.044** 0.006** 0.003 0.034** 0.390** 1.000
SPR(OPEN) 0.173** −0.027** −0.006** −0.009** −0.043** −0.136** −0.073** 1.000
SPR(CLOSE) 0.158** −0.025** −0.005** −0.007** −0.044** −0.189** −0.126** 0.465** 1.000
SPREAD 0.332** −0.021** −0.001 −0.008** −0.052** −0.283** −0.084** 0.569** 0.570** 1.000
SIZE −0.223** 0.030** 0.001 0.009** 0.051** 0.163** 0.008 −0.563** −0.531** −0.705** 1.000
CTO 0.055** 0.058** 0.038** 0.028** 0.016** −0.011** 0.020** 0.021** 0.006** 0.020** −0.017**
OTC −0.044** −0.020** 0.000 −0.006** 0.051** 0.009** −0.023** −0.005** −0.018** −0.024** 0.029**
DIFF 0.056** 0.037** 0.011** 0.011** −0.045** −0.011** 0.027** 0.009** 0.017** 0.025** −0.028**
DIFF – TC 0.000 0.037** 0.010** 0.011** −0.040** 0.040** 0.061** −0.203** −0.166** −0.134** 0.119**
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open and close, we obtain a significant negative mean difference after transaction
costs (DIFF – TC) of −71 bp. Note that the median value of the overnight return
in Panel A of Table 1 (CTO) is somewhat smaller than the mean, while the me-
dian trading day return in Panel A (OTC) is approximately the same as the mean.
Finally, the 24-hour return (i.e., the sum of CTO and OTC) is close to 3 bp per
day, which corresponds to around 8% per annum.
B. Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables
Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in
the study. First consider our 2 proxies for retail attention. The average squared
close-to-close return (VOLt−1) is 0.127%, while the mean daily retail net buying
(RETAIL NETBUYt−1) is not significantly different from 0. The latter result in-
dicates that, during the 1997–2001 sample period, there was no substantive shift
in ownership of NASDAQ stocks between retail and institutional investors.
Next we present 3 measures of the intensity of retail net buying near the day’s
open (NetBuy Open, NetBuy 15Min, and NetBuy DIFF). These mean values are
significantly positive, indicating that retail investors tend to be net buyers of stocks
at the open, and during the first 15 minutes of the trading day. In addition, the rate
of net retail buying in the 1st hour is significantly greater than the analogous
hourly rate over the rest of the trading day.
Finally, consider our measures of short sale constraints and transaction costs.
We find that mean institutional ownership (INST) is 52% of shares outstanding.
This number is higher than the 34% reported in Nagel (2005), because our sample
is limited to larger firms. Relative short interest averages 3.8% of shares outstand-
ing across all stocks and days in the sample, similar to that reported in Asquith
et al. (2005). The average spread at the open is 1.06% of the quote midpoint, while
the average spread at the close is 0.62%, and the mean effective half spread is
0.17%. Finally, the average firm has a market capitalization of $5.21 billion. Note
that the medians for several variables in Panel B are smaller than their correspond-
ing means, indicating some degree of positive skewness for these firm attributes.
C. Correlations across the Main Variables
In Panel C of Table 1 we report the average Spearman correlation across each
pair of variables.15 These correlations are generally consistent with our expecta-
tions. First, note that our 2 proxies for retail investor attention have a significant
positive correlation of 6%. Second, both proxies are positively correlated with our
measures of net retail buying pressure near the open. Third, both attention mea-
sures are positively correlated with the overnight return (CTO), and negatively
correlated with the trading day return (OTC). All of this evidence is consistent
with an upwardly biased opening price for stocks that are subject to higher atten-
tion by retail investors.
15Spearman correlations are applied to reduce the influence of outliers. Pearson correlations yield
similar results.
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Fourth, consider the association between our proxies for short sale con-
straints and stock returns during the overnight period versus the trading day period.
The percent of institutional ownership (INST) is significantly and negatively cor-
related with the overnight return (CTO) and positively correlated with the trading
day return (OTC), while the opposite tendencies are apparent for RSI. This out-
come suggests that stocks subject to more binding short sale constraints (i.e., with
lower institutional ownership or higher short interest) tend to have larger overnight
returns and trading day reversals. This result is also consistent with predictions
based on our theory of attention-based overpricing at the open.
Fifth, the spread measures are positively correlated with the overnight return
and negatively correlated with the trading day return, indicating a tendency for
larger overnight returns and trading day reversals for stocks with higher transac-
tion costs. In addition, the spread measures are negatively correlated with firm
size and institutional holdings, as expected.
Finally, firm size is negatively related to overnight returns (OTC) and pos-
itively related to trading day returns (CTO). This outcome suggests that smaller
firms have a tendency for larger positive overnight returns and trading day re-
versals. In addition, firm size is negatively correlated with one of our attention
proxies (VOLt−1) and positively correlated with institutional ownership (INST)
and our 2nd attention proxy (RETAIL NETBUYt−1). This evidence reinforces
the need to control for size when we analyze the influence of institutional owner-
ship or retail investor attention on daily returns in our analysis (see Nagel (2005)).
D. The Intraday Price Pattern
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 raise the question of whether this aver-
age positive overnight return and negative trading day reversal are due to a high
opening price, a low closing price, or both. We address this issue by examining
the pattern in prices throughout the trading day. For each stock, we collect data on
intraday midquotes at 30-minute intervals. In addition, we gather the midquotes
at 5-minute intervals during the first and last 30 minutes of the trading day. Then,
at each 5- or 30-minute interval (T), we construct the ratio of the midquote at that
time to the day’s closing midquote.16 We then find the average of each intraday
price ratio across all stocks every day. Finally, we compute the time-series mean
of these cross-sectional average price ratios for all days in the sample period.
Figure 1 plots the intraday pattern in this average ratio of the midquote at
each intraday time T to the closing midquote, across all stocks and days in the
sample, along with the 95% confidence interval about a ratio of 1. Note that this
confidence interval collapses to 0 at the close, when the price ratio equals 1 for
all firms. This intraday price pattern reveals that, on average, the opening price is
significantly higher than the closing price by approximately 8 bp (i.e., the opening
price ratio= 1.0008). After the open, the price declines during the first 60 minutes
of trading to within the 95% confidence interval about 1 and then levels off during
16We choose the closing price to scale intraday price ratios because our main analysis focuses on
open-to-close and close-to-open returns. Scaling by the average midquote between 11AM and 3PM
yields similar results.
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FIGURE 1
Intraday Price Pattern: Ratio of Midquote at Intraday Time (T ) to the Closing Midquote
across the 3,000 Largest U.S. Stocks and All Days (1996–2008)
This intraday price pattern traces out the ratio of the midquote at different times (T) during the trading day, relative to
the closing midquote. These intraday price ratios are computed for each stock at 5-minute intervals over the first and last
30 minutes of the trading day, and at 30-minute intervals over the rest of the trading day. First, for each day we average
this price ratio at every intraday time (T ) across all stocks in the sample. Second, we compute the time-series mean of
these daily cross-sectional averages across all days in the sample period. The 95% confidence interval about a ratio of
1.0 is constructed using the standard error of the time-series mean across all days, at each time (T ).
the middle of the day, before rising somewhat during the last few minutes of
trading. This intraday pattern is consistent with the implications of our attention-
based explanation, indicating that prices near the open tend to be high relative to
subsequent intraday prices.17
IV. Main Empirical Tests
A. Investor Attention and the Intensity of Net Retail Buying Near
the Open
Our 1st hypothesis is that high-attention days are followed by high net retail
buying at the start of the next trading day. We test this hypothesis by comparing
our 3 measures of the intensity of net retail buying near the open (NetBuy Open,
NetBuy 15Min, and NetBuy DIFF) across portfolios partitioned by our proxies
for attention, while controlling for firm size. These results appear in the first
3 columns of Table 2.
In this approach we consider each trading day as a separate event. For each
day, we control for firm size by initially sorting all firms into size terciles, based on
the firm’s mean market capitalization over the previous 20 trading days.18 Then,
within each size tercile, we form 3 finer portfolios by independently sorting based
on each proxy for attention: VOLt−1 or RETAIL NETBUYt−1. Our size-adjusted
17In tests not reported here, we investigate whether overnight liquidity risk can explain these
overnight return patterns, in the spirit of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003). According to this theory, investors are willing to pay less at the daily close for stocks subject
to greater overnight liquidity risk, measured by a stock’s sensitivity to overnight changes in market liq-
uidity. We find no evidence that stocks with greater overnight liquidity risk have lower closing prices,
or greater overnight returns.
18Results are robust when we do not control for size in this partitioning scheme.
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TABLE 2
Net Retail Buying Near the Open of the Trading Day, Overnight Returns, Trading Day
Returns, and 24-Hour Returns across Portfolios Sorted by Our 2 Proxies for Retail Investor
Attention: Return Volatility and Net Retail Buying Yesterday
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 present information about the intensity of net retail buying at the open and during the first
15 minutes of the trading day, respectively:
(Column 1) NetBuy Open = the mean proportion of stocks each day for which the 1st trade of the day is a
purchase by a Retail Trader, minus 0.5.
(Column 2) NetBuy 15Min = (Net Retail Buy Volume) / (Total Retail Share Volume), over the first 15 minutes
of the trading day.
In column 3 we report the difference between the hourly rate of net buying by retail investors during the 1st hour of trading
and the analogous hourly rate during the rest of the trading day, as a percent of shares outstanding. This measure is
defined as follows:
(Column 3) NetBuy DIFF = [(Net Retail Buy Volume in 1st Hour)
− (Net Retail Buy Volume in Last 5.5 Hours / 5.5)] / (shares outstanding).
In columns 4–6, we give the mean returns over 3 time frames: overnight (close-to-open (CTO)), trading day (open-to-close
(OTC)), and 24 hours (close-to-close (CTC)). We report all of these measures for a 3 × 1 scheme of portfolios where
stocks are partitioned each day into terciles by the level of retail investor attention. For every portfolio, we first compute
the mean value of each measure across firms every day, and then average these cross-sectional means across all days
in the sample. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. aThese measures of net retail buying
near the open are computed for all NASDAQ stocks (1997–2001).
Panel A. Using Return Volatility Yesterday (VOLt−1) to Proxy for Retail Investor Attention: 3,000 Largest U.S. Stocks
(1997–2001)
1 2 3 4 5 6
NetBuy Opena NetBuy 15Mina NetBuy DIFFa Overnight Trading Day 24-Hour
Attention 1st Trade 1st 15-Min (1st Hour – Rest) CTO OTC CTC
Low −0.003 0.018** 0.014 0.030** −0.030 0.000
Medium 0.002 0.022** 0.021 0.040** −0.050* 0.000
High 0.012** 0.030** 0.045** 0.130** −0.130** 0.010
High− Low 0.015 0.012 0.031 0.110 −0.100 0.010
t-statistic 6.2** 4.3** 10.9** 7.7** −3.1** 0.1
Panel B. Using Retail Net Buying Yesterday (RETAIL NETBUYt−1) to Proxy for Retail Investor Attention: NASDAQ
Stocks (1997–2001)
1 2 3 4 5 6
NetBuy Open NetBuy 15Min NetBuy DIFF Overnight Trading Day 24-Hour
Attention 1st Trade 1st 15-Min (1st Hour – Rest) CTO OTC CTC
Low −0.017** −0.034** −0.004** 0.040* −0.120* −0.080
Medium 0.004* 0.024** 0.020** 0.160** −0.160** 0.000
High 0.024** 0.079** 0.060** 0.260** −0.270** 0.000
High− Low 0.041 0.113 0.064 0.220 −0.150 0.070
t-statistic 18.8** 37.4** 24.3** 6.8** −2.1* 0.7
high-attention portfolio each day thus contains the top 1/3 of stocks by either atten-
tion proxy, within each size tercile. We then compute the cross-sectional means of
our 3 measures of the intensity of net retail buying near the open, for each portfo-
lio based on low, medium, or high size-adjusted retail investor attention. Finally,
we average these cross-sectional means across all days in the sample period. The
t-statistics are based on the Newey-West (1987) adjusted standard errors of the
time-series means.
The first 3 columns in Panel A of Table 2 present our 3 measures of the
average intensity of net retail buying near the open, for portfolios based on low,
medium, or high attention, where the level of retail investor attention is proxied
by return volatility yesterday (VOLt−1). The first 3 columns of Panel B present
the analogous results using net retail buying yesterday (RETAIL NETBUYt−1)
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to proxy for attention. In both Panels A and B, all 3 measures are significantly
positive for the subsample of high-attention stocks. Furthermore, the difference
of means across portfolios with high versus low attention is always significantly
positive at the 1% level. Together, these results confirm our 1st hypothesis, in-
dicating that i) the intensity of retail buying near the open of the trading day is
significantly greater for high-attention stocks than for low-attention stocks, and
ii) the intensity of retail buying of high-attention stocks is significantly greater
during the 1st hour than it is during the rest of the trading day.19
B. Investor Attention and Overnight and Trading Day Returns
Our 2nd hypothesis predicts that this attention-triggered retail buying pres-
sure at the open should result in opening prices that are high relative to prices
during the rest of the trading day. We test this hypothesis by comparing the
overnight and trading day returns across portfolios based on low, medium, or
high attention. Results appear in the next 2 columns of Table 2.
Panels A and B of Table 2 both reveal a strong tendency for positive mean
overnight returns and negative trading day reversals, which increase in magni-
tude and significance as we consider stocks subject to higher levels of attention.
In Panel A, when we analyze the main sample of the 3,000 largest U.S. stocks,
we find that the mean overnight return (trading day reversal) for the high-attention
portfolio is +13 bp (−13 bp) per day. In contrast, the analogous results for the sub-
sample of low-attention stocks in Panel A are much smaller, at only +3 (−3) bp
per day. In Panel B, when we analyze the abridged sample of NASDAQ stocks, the
analogous results for the high-attention portfolio are larger in magnitude, averag-
ing +26 (−27) bp per day. Once again, the subsample of low-attention NASDAQ
stocks in Panel B has much smaller means, at +4 (−12) bp per day. In both panels,
the mean difference t-test indicates that the overnight return (trading day reversal)
is significantly larger for the portfolio of stocks subject to high retail attention.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the mean 24-hour close-to-close return in the
last column of Table 2 is not significantly different from 0 for any portfolio in
Panels A or B. This result indicates that the significant overnight return patterns
in Panels A and B represent a temporary mispricing at the open, which tends to
be corrected during the course of the typical trading day.
C. Investor Attention, Overnight and Trading Day Returns, and
Institutional Ownership
In this section we consider the role of institutional ownership in concert with
our proxies for retail investor attention. Stocks with low institutional ownership
necessarily have a high concentration of retail investors and are also difficult
to short sell. For these stocks, we expect greater upward price pressure at the
open on days following news that attracts the attention of retail investors (prox-
ied by yesterday’s return volatility or net retail buying). We test this hypothesis
19Using net retail buy volume over the 1st minute or the first 5 minutes of the trading day yields
robust results.
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by expanding our portfolio approach to compare average overnight and trading
day returns across portfolios of firms that are independently partitioned along 2
dimensions (the level of retail investor attention and institutional ownership),
while controlling for firm size.
As before, we control for firm size by initially sorting all firms into terciles
based on the firm’s mean market capitalization over the previous 20 days. Then,
within each size tercile, we form 3 finer portfolios by independently sorting based
on i) the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of the previous quar-
ter (INST) or ii) each proxy for retail attention yesterday (VOLt−1 or RETAIL
NETBUYt−1). This procedure results in a 3 × 3 scheme of portfolios, sorted by
size-adjusted institutional ownership and each proxy for retail attention.
Results are provided in Table 3. Panel A analyzes the main sample and uses
yesterday’s squared return (VOLt−1) to proxy for retail investor attention at the
open. This panel presents three 3 × 3 schemes of double-sorted portfolios that
provide the mean overnight returns, trading day returns, and 24-hour returns,
respectively. On average, there are 261 stocks in each of the 9 portfolios within
every double-sorted partitioning scheme in Panel A.
First, consider the mean overnight returns (CTO) from the left 3× 3 scheme
in Panel A of Table 3. All portfolios in this scheme have positive mean overnight
TABLE 3
Overnight Returns, Trading Day Returns, and 24-Hour Returns across Portfolios
Double-Sorted by Proxies for Retail Investor Attention Yesterday and Institutional Ownership
Table 3 reports mean overnight returns (close-to-open (CTO)), trading day returns (open-to-close (OTC)), and 24-hour
returns (close-to-close (CTC)) for a 3 × 3 scheme of portfolios partitioned each day into terciles along 2 dimensions.
The portfolios in each row are sorted according to a low, medium, or high level of retail investor attention yesterday; the
columns are sorted by institutional ownership in the previous quarter. In Panel A we proxy retail investor attention using
stock return volatility lagged 1 day. In Panel B we use the net number of shares bought by retail investors all day yesterday,
as a percent of total share volume. For every portfolio in each 3 × 3 scheme, we first compute the mean return across
firms every day, and we then average these cross-sectional means across all days in the sample period. * and ** indicate
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. aOn average, there are 261 firms in the portfolio for each cell
of these 3× 3 partitioning schemes. bOn average, there are 90 firms in the portfolio for each cell of these 3× 3 partitioning
schemes.
Panel A. Using Stock Return Volatility Yesterday to Proxy for Retail Investor Attention: 3,000 Largest
U.S. Stocks (1996–2008)a
Retail Investor Attention Overnight Return (CTO%) Trading Day Return (OTC%) 24-Hour Return (CTC%)
Stock Return Volatility Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership
Yesterday Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Low 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** −0.03* −0.03 −0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Medium 0.05** 0.04** 0.04** −0.06** −0.04 −0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.00
High 0.17** 0.13** 0.10** −0.17** −0.12** −0.09** 0.00 0.01 0.01
High− Low 0.13 0.11 0.08 −0.13 −0.09 −0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01
t-statistic 8.9** 7.7** 5.8** −4.0** −2.7** −2.0* 0.0 0.4 0.3
Panel B. Using Net Retail Buying Yesterday to Proxy for Retail Investor Attention: NASDAQ Stocks (1997–2001)b
Retail Investor Attention Overnight Return (CTO%) Trading Day Return (OTC%) 24-Hour Return (CTC%)
Net Retail Buying Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership
Yesterday Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Low 0.09** 0.06* 0.02 −0.19** −0.15** −0.09 −0.09 −0.09 −0.07
Medium 0.23** 0.18** 0.13** −0.28** −0.21** −0.10 −0.06 −0.03 0.02
High 0.34** 0.31** 0.24** −0.42** −0.30** −0.22** −0.08 0.01 0.02
High− Low 0.24 0.25 0.22 −0.23 −0.15 −0.13 0.01 0.10 0.09
t-statistic 6.4** 7.1** 6.5** −2.9** −2.0* −1.7 0.1 1.1 1.0
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returns, whose magnitudes increase with the level of retail investor attention. The
bottom row of portfolios contains the largest means in this scheme, indicating
that stocks with high retail attention tend to have the largest overnight returns.
The mean difference t-test at the bottom of every column indicates that stocks
with high retail attention significantly outperform stocks with low retail attention
during the overnight period, conditional on institutional ownership. In addition,
the left column of each scheme contains the largest element in every row, indicat-
ing that stocks with low institutional ownership tend to have the largest overnight
returns. Finally, the bottom left corner cell contains stocks that are most prone to
overpricing at the open, as they are subject to both high retail attention and low
institutional ownership. The stocks in this cell have the largest mean overnight re-
turn, which averages +17 bp per day. In contrast, the top right corner cell contains
stocks that are least prone to overpricing at the open, with low retail attention
and high institutional ownership. The stocks in this cell have the smallest mean
overnight return, at only +2 bp per day.
Second, consider the trading day returns (OTC) from the middle 3×3 scheme
in Panel A of Table 3. All portfolios in this scheme have negative mean trading day
reversals, whose magnitudes increase with the level of retail attention. However,
these mean trading day reversals are only significant for portfolios in the bot-
tom row, among stocks with high attention, or in the left column, among stocks
with low institutional ownership. Here the mean difference t-test for every column
shows that stocks with high retail attention significantly underperform stocks with
low attention during the trading day. In addition, the bottom left corner cell now
contains the largest negative mean trading day reversal in the scheme, at −17 bp
per day, while the top right corner cell contains the smallest negative trading day
reversal, at only −3 bp per day.
Third, the last 3 × 3 scheme in Panel A of Table 3 reinforces the result
from the last column of Table 2, showing that attention-based overpricing at the
open is a short-term intraday phenomenon. Even for the most overpriced stocks
(subject to high retail attention and low institutional holdings), the significant
price inflation at the open is completely reversed during the trading day, so that
the mean close-to-close return is not significantly different from 0.
Next consider the results in Panel B of Table 3, which analyze the abridged
sample of NASDAQ stocks during 1997–2001 and use net retail buying yesterday
to proxy for attention. These results are consistent with those in Panel A, although
the price inflation at the open is substantially larger in magnitude for the abridged
sample. In the first 3× 3 scheme of Panel B, the mean overnight return for stocks
most prone to overpricing at the open (i.e., the bottom left corner cell) is now
+34 bp per day. This result contrasts with the top right corner cell, which contains
the smallest mean overnight return, at only 2 bp per day. Similarly, in the second
3× 3 scheme of Panel B, the mean trading day reversal for the bottom left corner
cell is −42 bp, but it is only −9 bp for the top right corner cell. Once again, the
third 3 × 3 scheme of Panel B contains mean 24-hour returns that are smaller in
magnitude and never significantly different from 0.
One likely reason for the stronger intraday price pattern for the abridged
sample of NASDAQ stocks during 1997–2001, in Panel B of Table 3, is that this
period represents a time of high investor sentiment (e.g., see Baker and Wurgler
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(2006) and Section V). Furthermore, NASDAQ stocks as a group tend to have
lower institutional ownership and are generally more volatile, more difficult to
value, and more costly to arbitrage. We investigate these issues next.
D. Stocks that Are Difficult to Value and Costly to Arbitrage
This section further addresses our 2nd hypothesis by examining the relation
between overpricing at the open and variables that proxy for the difficulty in valu-
ing a stock, and the costs of arbitrage. Both of these attributes of a stock are likely
to exacerbate the extent of overpricing at the open found in Table 3 (see Baker
and Wurgler (2006), Kumar and Lee (2006)). To this end, Table 4 reproduces the
analysis in each panel of Table 3, after restricting the samples used in Table 3 to
focus on finer subsamples of stocks each day that are harder to value and more
costly to arbitrage: i) We limit the sample to the 50% of firms each day with the
highest return volatility over the previous 20 trading days, to represent stocks that
are hard to value;20 ii) we narrow this focus by considering the 50% of the hard-
to-value firms in i) with the highest mean effective half spread over the previous
20 trading days;21 and iii) we further confine the sample each day to the 20% of
the hard-to-value, high-transaction-cost firms in ii) with the highest relative short
interest during the previous month.22
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results after applying all 3 restrictions above
on the main sample, using volatility yesterday (VOLt−1) to proxy for retail in-
vestor attention. Panel B presents the analogous results for the abridged sample,
using net retail buying yesterday (RETAIL NETBUYt−1) to proxy for attention.
First consider the results in Panel A of Table 4. After applying restrictions
i)–iii) on the main sample, there are an average of 13 stocks within every double-
sorted portfolio each day. The resulting 3×3 schemes in Panel A follow the same
pattern as those in Table 3, although the positive overnight returns and negative
trading day reversals are much larger in magnitude, as predicted. In particular, the
bottom left corner cell of the 1st (2nd) 3 × 3 scheme in Panel A now reveals a
mean overnight return (trading day reversal) of +43 (−45) bp.
Second, Panel B of Table 4 presents the analogous results for the abridged
sample of NASDAQ stocks over the period from 1997 to 2001. After applying re-
strictions i)–iii) on the abridged sample, there are now an average of 5 firms within
every double-sorted portfolio each day. The resulting 3 × 3 schemes in Panel B
follow the same pattern, although the positive overnight returns and negative trad-
ing day reversals are much larger. In particular, the bottom left corner cell of the
20Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that recent volatility is a good proxy for the difficulty in valuing
stocks. We have also used the firm’s book-to-market (B/M) ratio from the previous quarter as an
alternative measure of this aspect of a stock. Results are consistent with those using return volatility
over the past month and are summarized in Table 5. We also note that stocks with high volatility are
costly to sell short, due to potential margin calls. Thus, high volatility also represents a potential limit
to arbitrage.
21Sadka and Scherbina (2007) propose that high transaction costs act as an additional limit to
arbitrage, and they document that such stocks underperform over time.
22Asquith et al. (2005) argue that stocks with both low institutional ownership and high short
interest are subject to more binding short sale constraints.
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TABLE 4
Overnight Returns, Trading Day Returns, and 24-Hour Returns across Double-Sorted
Portfolios, for Subsamples of Stocks Each Day that Are Hard to Value, with High
Transaction Costs, and with High Short Interest
Table 4 follows the same format as Table 3. Panel A uses yesterday’s return volatility to proxy for retail investor attention, in
order to analyze the subsample of stocks each day i) that are hard to value (i.e., the 50% of stocks with the highest return
volatility over the past 20 days), ii) with high transaction costs (i.e., the 50% of stocks in i) with the highest effective half
spread), and iii) with high short interest (i.e., the 20% of stocks in ii) with the highest relative short interest). Panel B provides
analogous results using yesterday’s net retail buying to proxy for retail attention. * and ** indicate statistical significance at
the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. aOn average, there are 13 firms in the portfolio for each cell of these 3 × 3 partitioning
schemes. bOn average, there are 5 firms in the portfolio for each cell of these 3 × 3 partitioning schemes.
Panel A. Using Stock Return Volatility Yesterday to Proxy for Retail Investor Attention: 3,000 Largest
U.S. Stocks (1996–2008)a
Retail Investor Attention Overnight Return (CTO%) Trading Day Return (OTC%) 24-Hour Return (CTC%)
Stock Return Volatility Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership
Yesterday Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Low 0.15** 0.07 0.12** −0.33** −0.27** −0.18** −0.19** −0.20** −0.07
Medium 0.22** 0.19** 0.14** −0.35** −0.24** −0.19** −0.13** −0.06 −0.05
High 0.43** 0.39** 0.29** −0.45** −0.35** −0.30** −0.02 0.04 −0.01
High− Low 0.28 0.32 0.18 −0.12 −0.08 −0.12 0.16 0.24 0.06
t-statistic 8.6** 6.4** 6.0** −1.8 −1.1 −1.8 2.2* 2.7** 0.8
Panel B. Using Net Retail Buying Yesterday to Proxy for Retail Investor Attention: NASDAQ Stocks (1997–2001)b
Retail Investor Attention Overnight Return (CTO%) Trading Day Return (OTC%) 24-Hour Return (CTC%)
Net Retail Buying Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership Institutional Ownership
Yesterday Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Low 0.35** 0.27** 0.10 −0.43** −0.47** −0.24* −0.08 −0.20 −0.14
Medium 0.47** 0.46** 0.27** −0.71** −0.61** −0.43** −0.24 −0.15 −0.15
High 0.61** 0.65** 0.49** −0.70** −0.67** −0.52** −0.09 −0.02 −0.03
High− Low 0.26 0.38 0.39 −0.27 −0.20 −0.28 −0.01 0.18 0.11
t-statistic 3.3** 4.8** 5.0** −1.8 −1.2 −1.9 −0.1 1.0 0.7
1st (2nd) 3 × 3 scheme in Panel B now reveals a mean overnight return (trading
day reversal) of +61 (−70) bp per day.
Together, the results in Table 4 reinforce the view that high-attention firms
have positive overnight returns and trading day reversals that are larger in mag-
nitude when the firm is more difficult to value, transaction costs are higher, and
short sale constraints are more binding. This evidence provides further support
for our theory of attention-based overpricing at the open.23
V. Variation over Time in Overpricing at the Open: The Role
of Sentiment
The previous sections establish that, for a large group of stocks subject to
high attention and low institutional holdings, the opening price tends to be very
high relative to intraday prices. In this section we examine how the magnitude
23In tests not reported here, we have reproduced this analysis for each stage of this progression to
finer subsamples of stocks that are more difficult to value and more costly to arbitrage, after applying
each restriction, i)–iii), in turn. At each stage, the 3× 3 schemes reveal progressively larger overnight
returns and trading day reversals. Results are available from the authors.
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of this opening price inflation changes through time, and whether any such time
variation in this overpricing is related to changes in investor sentiment.
This analysis requires a time-series measure that tracks the level of retail
investor sentiment over time. We examine 2 alternative proxies. Our 1st measure is
the sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2006), (2007). This sentiment measure
is a composite index based on the 1st principal component of 6 sentiment proxies,
orthogonalized with respect to several macroeconomic conditions. The Baker-
Wurgler (2006) sentiment index is available on a monthly basis from the start of
our sample period to the end of 2007.24
Our 2nd measure is the actual net buying activity of retail investors during
the 1st hour of the trading day, as a percent of shares outstanding, averaged across
all stocks and days during the month. This measure is motivated by the results in
Table 2, which indicate that net retail buying near the day’s open is an effective
proxy for cross-sectional differences in retail investor sentiment based on atten-
tion. We refer to this measure as our retail sentiment index. The available data on
net retail buying enable measurement of this sentiment index on a monthly basis
for the abridged sample of NASDAQ stocks over the period from 1997 to 2001.
Our tests in this section are designed to establish whether monthly varia-
tion in these 2 proxies for retail investor sentiment can explain variation through
time in the extent to which opening prices are pushed above “fundamental” values
(i.e., values during the rest of the trading day). In order to measure the extent of
opening price inflation during a given month, we first calculate daily overnight
and trading day returns for groups of stocks classified using the same proce-
dures as before. That is, for each day we compute the mean overnight and trading
day returns for the 3 × 3 scheme of portfolios sorted along 2 dimensions: size-
adjusted institutional ownership and retail investor attention yesterday. Next, for
each month, we calculate the mean daily overnight and trading day returns to
measure the average daily performance of each portfolio during the overnight
and trading day periods, respectively, throughout that month. Thus, our monthly
overnight (trading day) return measure for each portfolio, CTOm (OTCm), con-
tains the mean of daily overnight (trading day) returns during each month (m).
We then examine the monthly performance of a zero-cost hedge portfolio
that is long the stocks that are most subject to inflation of opening prices (i.e., the
bottom left corner portfolio in the 3×3 scheme) and short the stocks that are least
subject to inflation of opening prices (i.e., the top right corner portfolio). That
is, each day this hedge portfolio is long stocks with low institutional holdings
and high attention (bottom left corner), and short stocks with high institutional
ownership and low attention (top right corner). The monthly mean trading day
(open-to-close) return on this hedge portfolio represents the extent to which the
opening price exceeds the close, for stocks most prone to opening price inflation
relative to stocks least prone to this overpricing. Likewise, this monthly average
trading day return on the hedge portfolio provides one measure of changes over
time in market-wide hidden costs associated with the tendency for retail investors
to buy attention-grabbing stocks at the open (rather than the close).
24For details, see Baker and Wurgler (2006). Their monthly sentiment index can be downloaded
from Jeffrey Wurgler’s Web site (www.stern.nyu.edu/∼jwurgler).
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Figure 2 plots the evolution over the period from 1996 to 2009, of several
variables that measure retail investor sentiment, the extent of overpricing at the
open, and transaction costs. First, we plot in Figure 2 movements in the Baker-
Wurgler (2006) sentiment index over this period. Second, we also plot the average
return on the hedge portfolio during the overnight and trading day periods, respec-
tively, using yesterday’s return squared as the attention proxy. Finally, we plot the
daily average (negative value of the) effective half spread for the subsample of
stocks most sensitive to price inflation at the open (i.e., stocks with low institu-
tional ownership and high attention).25
FIGURE 2
Retail Investor Sentiment, Overnight Returns, and Transaction Costs (1996–2009)
Figure 2 presents the evolution over the period from 1996 to 2009, of several variables that measure retail investor sentiment,
the extent of overpricing at the open, and transaction costs. First, we report quarterly averages of the monthly “Baker-
Wurgler (2006) Sentiment Index.” Next, for each quarter, “Overnight Returns” plots the average daily overnight (close-to-
open) return of a zero-cost hedge portfolio that is long stocks with low institutional holdings and high attention (i.e., the
bottom left corner of the 3 × 3 scheme in Table 3), and short stocks with high institutional ownership and low attention
(i.e., top right corner of the scheme). “Trading Day Returns” plots the average trading day (open-to-close) return on the
same hedge portfolio. We also plot the average daily “Effective Half Spread” for the subsample of stocks that are most
sensitive to price inflation at the open (i.e., stocks in the bottom left corner of the scheme, with high attention and low
institutional ownership). Returns and spread are in percentage points.
Figure 3 presents the analogous information using our retail sentiment in-
dex, for the abridged sample of NASDAQ stocks over the period from 1997 to
2001. In this figure we compile the returns on the hedge portfolio using yes-
terday’s net retail buying as our proxy for attention. For comparison, we also
plot the Baker-Wurgler (2006) sentiment index and the (negative value of the)
25For clarity, we divide the Baker-Wurgler (2006) sentiment index by 2 and report quarterly aver-
ages of all variables.
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FIGURE 3
Retail Investor Sentiment, Overnight Returns, and Transaction Costs (1997–2002)
Figure 3 presents the evolution over the period from 1997 to 2002, of several variables that measure retail investor sentiment,
the extent of overpricing at the open, and transaction costs. We report quarterly averages of the monthly “Baker-Wurgler
(2006) Sentiment Index” and the quarterly average of the “Retail Investor Sentiment Index” (defined as the actual net
buying activity by retail investors during the 1st hour of the trading day, as a percent of shares outstanding, averaged
across all stocks and all days during the quarter). For each quarter, “Overnight Return” plots the average daily overnight
(close-to-open) return of a zero-cost hedge portfolio that is long stocks with low institutional holdings and high attention
(i.e., bottom left corner of the 3× 3 scheme in Table 3), and short stocks with high institutional ownership and low attention
(i.e., top right corner of the scheme). “Trading Day Return” plots the average trading day (open-to-close) return on the
same hedge portfolio. We also plot the average daily “Effective Half Spread” for the subsample of stocks that are most
sensitive to price inflation at the open (i.e., stocks in the bottom left corner of the scheme, with high attention and low
institutional ownership). Returns and spread are in percentage points.
mean effective half spread for the portfolio of stocks most subject to opening
price inflation.26
First consider the information in Figure 2. This plot reveals that overnight
returns on the hedge portfolio are positively related to the Baker-Wurgler (2006)
sentiment index (correlation is 0.30, p-value is 0.001), while trading day returns
are negatively related to this index (correlation is −0.33, p-value is 0.001). Simi-
larly, we find that the retail sentiment index in Figure 3 has a correlation of 0.47
( p-value is 0.001) with overnight returns on the hedge portfolio, and a correlation
of −0.51 ( p-value is 0.001) with trading day returns on the hedge portfolio. Fur-
thermore, in Figure 3 the Baker-Wurgler (2006) index is highly correlated with
the retail sentiment index. Based on the 60 months for which we have data on
both indices, we find a correlation of 0.77 (p-value is 0.001).
It is noteworthy that the positive overnight returns on the hedge portfolio in
Figures 2 and 3 become very large just prior to the technology crash in March of
2000 and remain positive throughout 2001. In comparison, the negative trading
day reversals on the hedge portfolio become even larger as this crash develops.
26Here we divide the Baker-Wurgler (2006) sentiment index by 2, multiply the retail sentiment
index by 10, and report quarterly averages of the variables.
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Apparently, the bulk of the 2000 correction in stocks most subject to opening
price inflation occurred during the trading day.27
Figures 2 and 3 also plot the average effective half spread for the subsample
of stocks most prone to price inflation at the open (i.e., those subject to high
attention and low institutional ownership). For comparison purposes, the negative
value of this measure of transaction costs is plotted alongside the trading day
(open-to-close) return of the hedge portfolio. Once again, we regard this trading
day return on the hedge portfolio as a measure of the implicit cost of buying at
the open (rather than the close) those stocks most prone to opening price inflation.
Both Figures 2 and 3 show that this implicit cost of buying at the open is similar in
magnitude to the effective half spread for much of the sample period. Moreover,
in times of high investor sentiment, this mean trading day reversal can be more
than twice the size of the effective half spread.
The major practical implication of this analysis is that retail traders incur a
substantial hidden transaction cost when they buy attention-grabbing stocks at the
open of the next trading day, because their herding behavior results in inflated
opening prices. The plots reveal that, over long periods, this implicit transaction
cost is similar in magnitude to the effective half spread.
VI. Robustness Tests
A. Alternative Portfolio Approaches
In Panel A of Table 5, we apply the main analysis from our portfolio ap-
proach of Table 3, but we base this analysis on alternative return measures, various
subsamples of stocks, or different time periods. For each test, the 4 columns on
the left side of Table 5 report results based on the main sample of the 3,000
largest U.S. stocks over the period from 1996 to 2008, where the level of re-
tail investor attention is proxied by return volatility yesterday (VOLt−1). The
right 4 columns present the analogous results based on the abridged sample of
NASDAQ stocks over the period from 1997 to 2001, using retail net buying
yesterday (RETAIL NETBUYt−1) to proxy for attention.
For brevity, in all of these robustness tests we only present the mean returns
for the 2 extreme corner portfolios of every 3 × 3 scheme, for stocks with low
institutional holdings and high attention (bottom left corner) and for stocks with
high institutional holdings and low attention (top right corner). The base case
provided at the top of Table 5 reproduces the results for these 2 corner portfolios
from Table 3. In every subsequent robustness test (row) of Panel A, we change
only one aspect of the analysis to facilitate comparison with the base case.
The series of tests in Panel A of Table 5 reveals that our results are ro-
bust when we use market-adjusted returns, median returns, or trade prices to
27We also note that the Baker-Wurgler (2006) sentiment index in Figures 2 and 3 peaks a few
months after March 2000, and after the peak of our retail investor sentiment index in Figure 3. This
delay in the peak of the Baker-Wurgler (2006) index may be due to their use of a 12-month lag for 3
of the 6 components in their index. They argue that combining these lagged values for 3 of their series
with current values of the other 3 series best captures annual variation in the 6 series (see Baker and
Wurgler (2006), (2007)).
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TABLE 5
Robustness Tests: Alternative Portfolio Approaches and Regression Analysis
For every robustness test in Panel A of Table 5, we reproduce the portfolio approach from Table 3, but we change some
aspect of the analysis. For brevity, we present only the 2 cells in each 3× 3 scheme that are subject to the greatest and least
forces behind overpricing at the open: the bottom left corner cell and the top right corner cell. The base case reproduces
these 2 corner cells from the 3 × 3 schemes in Table 3. In each subsequent test (row) of Panel A, we change only one
aspect of the analysis to facilitate comparison with the base case. Panel B provides the results of Fama-MacBeth (1973)
regression analysis. First, for each day in the sample period we estimate the cross-sectional regression model in equation
(1) for overnight returns (CTO) or for trading day returns (OTC). Second, we compute the time-series mean coefficients
across all days in the sample period. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. aResults
based on trade prices using VOLt−1 are computed over the sample period 1996–2004. bFor the NASDAQ stocks in the
right 4 columns, cutoffs of market capitalization for small and large stock quintiles are based on the stratification each day
using the 3,000 largest U.S. stocks. cFor the NASDAQ stocks in the right 4 columns, cutoffs of book-to-market (B/M) for
growth and value stock quintiles are based on the stratification each day using the 3,000 largest U.S. stocks. dData on
RETAIL NETBUYt−1 are unavailable before 1997, so the entries in this row for this proxy are for 1997–2000. eData on
RETAIL NETBUYt−1 are unavailable after 2001, so the entries in this row using this proxy are for 2001 only.
Panel A. Portfolio Approach: Alternative Return Measures and Subsamples
Bottom Left and Top Right Corner Cells in Each 3 × 3 Matrix
Sample: 3,000 Largest U.S. Stocks (1996–2008) NASDAQ Stocks (1997–2001)
Attention Proxy: VOLt−1 RETAIL NETBUYt−1
Return Measure: CTO(%) OTC(%) CTO(%) OTC(%)
Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom Top Bottom Top
Cell in 3× 3 Matrix: Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right
Base Case (Table 3) 0.17 0.02 −0.17 −0.03 0.34 0.02 −0.42 −0.09
Newey-West t-Ratio 11.9** 3.5** −5.6** −1.3 11.3** 1.0 −6.8** −1.8
1. Using market-adjusted 0.12 −0.03 −0.18 −0.03 0.24 −0.07 −0.42 −0.09
abnormal returns 14.1** −4.2** −10.1** −3.5** 12.3** −5.6** −9.8** −3.0**
2. Using trade pricesa 0.17 0.02 −0.17 −0.01 0.33 0.00 −0.41 −0.08
to measure returns 10.1** 2.7** −4.8** −0.3 11.0** 0.2 −6.8** −1.4
3. Using median return 0.09 0.02 −0.16 −0.04 0.20 0.01 −0.42 −0.11
across stocks each day 9.2** 3.4** −6.5** −2.5* 9.5** 0.8 −8.7** −2.5*
4. No low-price stocks 0.13 0.02 −0.13 −0.02 0.30 0.02 −0.37 −0.09
(with price<$5) 9.4** 2.9** −4.5** −1.1 10.0** 0.8 −6.0** −1.7
5. NASDAQ stocks 0.28 0.03 −0.27 −0.07 0.34 0.02 −0.42 −0.09
13.9** 3.6** −7.1** −2.5* 11.3** 1.0 −6.8** −1.8
6. NYSE stocks 0.09 0.01 −0.07 −0.01 — — — —
6.0** 0.8 −3.1** −0.7 — — — —
7. Small stock quintileb 0.29 0.07 −0.19 −0.05 0.45 0.07 −0.39 −0.08
18.3** 8.6** −5.3** −2.1* 13.8** 3.3** −5.9** −1.4
8. Large stock quintileb 0.09 0.01 −0.11 0.00 0.32 0.07 −0.37 −0.21
5.1** 1.5 −3.9** 0.2 6.8** 1.9 −4.2** −2.9**
9. Growth stocks 0.20 0.03 −0.23 −0.04 0.37 0.04 −0.46 −0.14
(low quintile, B/M)c 9.8** 3.4** −6.0** −1.5 8.6** 1.2 −5.5** −1.9
10. Value stocks 0.13 0.04 −0.09 −0.03 0.23 −0.01 −0.24 −0.01
(high quintile, B/M)c 9.5** 4.7** −3.0** −1.5 6.2** −0.3 −3.5** −0.2
11. Momentum losers 0.32 0.06 −0.31 −0.08 0.48 0.09 −0.61 −0.17
(low quintile, 6-mo. return) 14.7** 6.2** −8.0** −3.0** 12.5** 3.2** −7.9** −2.7**
12. Momentum winners 0.14 0.03 −0.13 −0.04 0.26 0.02 −0.25 −0.12
(high quintile, 6-mo. return) 9.0** 3.4** −4.0** −1.7 8.5** 1.3 −3.8** −1.9
13. Mondays 0.20 0.04 −0.35 −0.11 0.37 0.05 −0.66 −0.30
5.8** 3.0** −5.4** −2.6** 5.4** 1.0 −4.8** −2.7**
14. Other weekdays 0.16 0.02 −0.12 −0.01 0.33 0.02 −0.36 −0.04
10.3** 2.5* −3.8** −0.2 9.9** 0.7 −5.6** −0.8
15. 1996–2000d 0.25 0.04 −0.24 −0.03 0.37 0.05 −0.46 −0.12
10.2** 4.1** −5.0** −1.4 11.4** 2.2* −6.9** −2.2*
16. 2001–2004e 0.16 0.00 −0.22 0.01 0.17 −0.11 −0.21 0.03
6.4** 0.3 −4.1** 0.5 2.5* −2.2* −1.4 0.3
17. 2005–2008 0.13 0.03 −0.16 −0.07 — — — —
5.2** 2.0* −2.7** −1.5 — — — —
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 5 (continued)
Robustness Tests: Alternative Portfolio Approaches and Regression Analysis
Panel B. Fama-MacBeth Regression Analysis of Model (1)
Sample: 3,000 Largest U.S. Stocks (1996–2008) NASDAQ Stocks (1997–2001)
Attention Proxy: VOLt−1 RETAIL NETBUYt−1
Dependent Variable: CTO(%) OTC(%) CTO(%) OTC(%)
Attention 0.179 −0.272 0.218 −0.178
4.8** −9.0** 15.5** −6.0**
Institutional ownership −0.035 0.093 −0.113 0.335
−2.5* 4.4** −4.0** 3.8**
Firm size 0.024 0.159 0.010 0.309
0.7 11.9** 0.3 8.5**
Avg. no. of firms per day 2,342 2,342 1,013 1,005
Avg. adj. R2 0.045 0.045 0.021 0.015
measure returns, and when we exclude low-price stocks. This behavior is also
ubiquitous across NASDAQ and NYSE stocks, small and large stocks, growth
and value stocks, and momentum winners and losers, although there is a larger
mean overnight return and trading day reversal for small stocks, NASDAQ stocks,
growth stocks, and momentum losers. We also find that these patterns are larger in
magnitude on Mondays, but they are also present on the other days of the week. In
addition, these results appear in all subperiods, though they decline in magnitude
over time, perhaps due to regulatory changes and technological advances, such as
decimalization in 2001 and the subsequent expansion of algorithmic trading.
B. Fama-MacBeth Regression Analysis
In this section we examine whether our results are robust to alternative
methodology, by applying regression analysis based on the following model:28
CTOit (OTCit) = a0 + a1 ATTENTIONit + a2 INSTit + a3 SIZEit + εit,(1)
where ATTENTIONit = each proxy for retail investor attention
(VOLt−1 or RETAIL NETBUYt−1),
INSTit = the firm’s percentage institutional ownership from
the previous quarter,
SIZEit = the firm’s mean market capitalization over the
previous 20 trading days.
In this analysis, the dependent variables are winsorized to eliminate outliers
beyond 1% in the tails. In addition, the independent variables are replaced with
28We have also included the firm’s effective half spread and relative short interest in model (1),
with robust results.
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their decile ranks, adjusted to range between −0.5 and +0.5. This rank regression
approach attenuates the influence of outliers.29
First, for every day (t) in the sample period, we estimate model (1) for the
cross section of stocks (i), using each dependent variable (CTO or OTC). Second,
we compute the time-series mean coefficients across all days (t) in the sample
period. The standard errors of these Fama-MacBeth (1973) mean coefficients are
used to construct the t-ratios.
Results appear in Panel B of Table 5. They show that the overnight return is
positively related to each proxy for retail investor attention yesterday, and nega-
tively related to the firm’s institutional ownership. Likewise, the trading day re-
versal is negatively associated with each attention proxy and positively related to
institutional ownership. Consistent with our theory of attention-based overpricing
at the open, these results imply a larger overnight return and trading day reversal
for stocks that are subject to higher levels of retail investor attention yesterday,
along with greater limits to arbitrage embodied in lower institutional ownership.
These results also reveal that smaller firms tend to have a larger trading day rever-
sal. We conclude that our evidence and its implications are not dependent upon
the research methodology applied.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of attention as a potential source of retail
investor sentiment, and examines whether attention-based retail trading causes
prices to temporarily deviate from fundamental values at the open of the typical
trading day. We show that high-attention days for individual stocks are followed
by high net retail buying at the start of the next trading day. Moreover, this in-
creased retail buying pressure results in opening prices that tend to be high relative
to prices during the rest of the trading day. Furthermore, we find that these pre-
dictable intraday price patterns are more pronounced for stocks that are difficult
to value and costly to arbitrage, and they are larger in magnitude during periods
of high investor sentiment.
This study is the first to examine intraday patterns in retail trading and price
formation in relation to investor sentiment, proxied by retail investor attention. By
investigating our theory of attention-based overpricing at the open, we uncover
and help resolve a heretofore unexplained intraday price anomaly: Stocks that
have recently attracted the attention of retail investors have a strong tendency for
net retail buying at the open, which leads to high opening prices and positive
returns during the overnight period, followed by reversals during the subsequent
trading day.
Our results should be of interest to investors and regulators alike. During
periods of high investor sentiment, a strategy of selling high-attention stocks at
the open and delaying purchases until later in the trading day can yield signifi-
cant improvements to performance. This evidence shows that some retail investors
bear substantive hidden costs, through their penchant for buying stocks at inflated
29Similar results are obtained when the analysis is applied to the original data.
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prices during the 1st hour of trading following high-attention days. During pe-
riods of high investor sentiment, for example, the implicit costs of buying high-
attention stocks at the start of the day can be twice the effective half spread. The
1st step toward reducing this hidden cost of buying high-attention stocks at the
open is to enhance awareness among retail traders of the potentially detrimental
price impact of such trading activity.
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